

I'm not robot!

author of the "Ode to Freedom" that provides the text for the four movements of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, as well as the source of materials for operas by Rossini and Verdi, in which Schiller was famous not only as a poet but also as a dramatist, historian, and at least during the 1790s as an aesthetic and philosopher. As a student in the military college of the Duke of Württemberg he trained as a physician, and his earliest writings were on the mind-body relationship. But he achieved instant fame with his play *The Robbers* (*Die Räuber*) in 1782, and then had to flee Württemberg in order to continue writing plays. Between 1783 and 1787, he wrote *Fiesko*, *Intrigue and Love* (*Kabale und Liebe*), and *Don Carlos*. He met Goethe in 1787, and was professor of history in nearby Jena from 1789 to 1799. During this period he wrote histories of the Thirty Years' War and the Dutch revolt against Spain. But he also devoted several years in the early 1790s to an intensive study of Kant, which then led to a series of essays including "On Grace and Dignity" (*Über Anmut und Würde*, 1793), *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind* (1795), and "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" (1795–6), as well as the unpublished "Kallias" letters on aesthetics (1793). After this period, Schiller returned to his original calling, writing the historical dramas *Wallenstein* (1798–9), *Maria Stuart* (1800), *The Maiden of Orleans* (*Die Jungfrau von Orleans*, 1801), *The Bride of Messina* (1803), and *Wilhelm Tell* (1804). Like so many of the others who have been discussed here (Baumgarten, Sulzer, Herz, Moritz) his life was cut short by lung disease, presumably tuberculosis, and he died at forty-five in 1805. Schiller's "Kallias" letters, written to his friend Gottfried Körner in January and February of 1793, were not historically influential, since they were not published for another half-century, but are fascinating reading today. In them Schiller argues that Kant's "subjectivist" conception of free play in aesthetic response has to be complemented with an "objectivist" conception of beauty as the appearance of freedom or self-determination in the object: a beautiful form is one that appears to us to be determined not by any forces outside of it but only by itself. For that reason "A form is beautiful, one might say, if it demands no explanation, or if it explains itself without a concept" ("Kallias" letter of 18 February 1793, p. 153). Although Thaller does not mention his name, his theory could also be interpreted as an attempt to refine Moritz's conception of beauty as that which is complete with itself. Had Kant known these letters, however, he could have replied that Schiller's notions of appearing to be self- rather than other-determined and demanding no explanation are still subjective, that is, they characterize how we respond to beautiful objects rather than designating any properties that could be attributed to objects independently of our response to them. Unlike the "Kallias" letters, Schiller's essay "On Naive and Sentimental Poetry" was immediately influential. Here Schiller describes the difference between "naive" and "sentimental" art. The former is an expression of an immediate emotional response to nature, where nature is thought of as "the subsistence of things on their own, being there according to their own immutable laws" (a conception of nature that derives from the conception of beauty in the "Kallias" letters). The latter self-consciously expresses a sense of our own separation from nature and a feeling that the self-subsistent things in nature "are what we were" and "what we should become once more" ("Naive and Sentimental Poetry," pp. 180–1), or a longing for a wholeness with nature that we think humans once had but that we have lost. Schiller identifies naive poetry with antiquity and sentimental poetry (and the sense of alienation from nature it expresses) with modernity. This essay can be seen as the source for the genre of philosophical histories of aesthetics that then flourished for several decades, beginning with Friedrich Schlegel's "On the Study of Greek Poetry" of 1797, continuing with Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's lectures on *The Philosophy of Art* of 1802–3, and culminating in the lectures on "Philosophy of Art or Aesthetics" that Hegel gave in Berlin during the 1820s—lectures that decisively changed the sense of the name "aesthetics" itself from its original meaning of a general science of sensibility that included responses to nature as well as art to its modern meaning as the philosophy of art. However, the two theoretical works by Schiller with which philosophers have most concerned themselves have been the 1793 essay "On Grace and Dignity" and the epistolary series *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, first written as an actual series of letters to Schiller's patron the Danish duke Augustenborg in 1793 and then rewritten for publication in 1795. These have typically been read as responses to Kant's moral philosophy, inspired by Kant in their general concern for autonomy as the essence of morality, but criticizing Kant for giving inadequate consideration to the rôle of sensibility in morality. "On Grace and Dignity" has been held to argue, in supposed opposition to Kant, for the necessity of developing feelings as part of what it takes to comply fully with the demands of morality, while Aesthetic Education has been read to argue that only the cultivation of aesthetic experience can transform individuals and their society as morality demands; the first of these can be considered a constitutive claim, and the second a causal claim. It will be argued here, on the contrary, that Kant actually makes greater claims for the significance and contribution of both moral sentiments and aesthetic responses to the individual achievement of morality than Schiller does. Specifically, while "On Grace and Dignity" argues that the moral determination of the will should be accompanied with certain moral sentiments on the will should be accompanied by certain moral sentiments on moral grounds. And while Aesthetic Education asserts that the development of taste is a necessary condition for the development of individual morality and social justice, which Kant never does, the variety of links that Kant recognizes between aesthetics and morality, described in section 7.2. above, show that the cultivation of taste can make a broader contribution to the realization of morality than Schiller realizes. 8.1 Kant and Schiller on Beauty, Grace, and Dignity We may begin with a different point about "On Grace and Dignity," however, namely that it is not primarily an essay in moral theory at all, but an essay in aesthetics, that is, an essay about the expression of moral qualities in the appearance of actual human beings. In this regard it is not a critique of Kantian moral theory but a critique of an aspect of Kantian aesthetics, namely Kant's theory of the "ideal of beauty" in the "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Schiller's use of the expression "ideal of beauty" very early in his essay signals that this is his primary target ("On Grace and Dignity," NA 253; Curran 126). Kant introduces the concept of the "ideal of beauty" in the third moment of the "Analytic of the Beautiful," which discusses the various relations that obtain between beauty and purposiveness. Kant begins the third moment by arguing that in its purest form the judgment of taste is a response to the mere appearance of the form of purposiveness in an object, as opposed to any actual purposiveness, in either of the senses of that concept, namely, actually serving some specific purpose or having been designed to serve some purpose. Correspondingly, Kant equates pure beauty with the mere form or appearance of purposiveness rather than with actual purposiveness. However, as we saw in section 7.1, Kant complicates his analysis by recognizing forms of beauty that are not pure but are connected with (although not reducible to) the recognition of actual purposiveness. The first of these forms is "adherent beauty," a beauty of form that is consistent with or appropriate for the actual purpose of an object that clearly has a purpose that constrains its possible form in various ways, such as an arsenal or a race horse. Then Kant comes to the "ideal of beauty," or "the highest model, the archetype of taste....in accordance with which [anyone] must judge everything that is an object of taste," a representation of an individual object or particular type of object that is maximally beautiful (CPJ, §17, 5:232). Kant signals that the search for an ideal of beauty is not something initiated by the logic of taste as such but by something external to taste, namely, the faculty of reason: the "archetype of taste...rests on reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum." Kant argues that the beauty for which an idea [or ideal] is to be sought cannot be a vague beauty, but there must be a beauty fixed by a concept of objective purposiveness, consequently it must not belong to the object of an entirely pure judgment of taste, but rather to one of a partly intellectualized judgment of taste. (CPJ, §17, 5:232–3) This means that the ideal of beauty is a species of adherent rather than free beauty. Kant then argues that there are two elements in such an ideal, namely a uniquely valuable purpose or end and a uniquely appropriate aesthetic expression of this purpose or end. "The human being alone is capable of an ideal of beauty," Kant then argues, because "the humanity in his person, as intelligence, is alone among all the objects in the world capable of the ideal of perfection" (*ibid.*, 5:233). That is, according to (practical) reason the human being is the only thing of unconditional value. But for this ideal to be an ideal of beauty, the unique moral value of humanity must find an outward expression which is somehow appropriate for it although it is not connected to it in accordance with any rule. This expression is found in the beauty of the "human figure," which is associated "with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness—goodness of soul, or purity, or strength, or repose, etc.—not in accordance with any rule but simply by "great force of the imagination" (*ibid.*, 5:235). Imagination is in fact doubly involved: first, because there is no way to derive what counts as beauty in the human figure from mere concepts or by any mechanical process (that could yield only "correctness in the presentation of the species"), so the ideal of maximum beauty can only be created by an act of the aesthetic imagination; and second, because there is no rule that says that moral value must be expressed in outward appearance or that outward appearance can be interpreted as an expression of moral value, but that adequate too must be created by the imagination. Schiller's first goal in "On Grace and Dignity" is to show that Kant's account of the ideal of beauty is not sufficiently precise in its account of what aspects of human beauty can be taken as an expression of the moral condition of a human being. He also contends that Kant's account does not offer an adequate explanation of why any features of the outward appearance should be taken as an expression of moral condition. More specifically, Schiller argues that there are two different moral conditions of human beings, grace and dignity, and these naturally find different external expressions in the appearance of human beings, and by implication in the artistic representation or mimesis of them. As a result, the ideal of beauty is more complicated than Kant recognizes. Moreover, there are good reasons why these moral conditions should find external expression, so the connection between moral condition and aesthetic response is much less arbitrary than Kant makes it seem. On Schiller's account, Kant's first mistake is to locate the ideal of beauty vaguely in the human figure rather than specifically in the bodily accompaniments of intentional actions that are the products of the human will, which, according to Kant himself, is the primary locus of moral value. This also means that it is a mistake for Kant to suggest, if that is what he means, that the ideal of beauty can be found in a general type of human being rather than in particular human beings, for actions are always done by particular human beings. Kant is of course committed to the general thesis that beauty is always a property of a particular, but it might be argued that he has lost sight of that commitment when he locates the ideal of beauty in something as general as "the human figure" as the expression of human morality. Schiller argues that the "architectonic beauty of the human form," that is, the fixed configuration of the features of a person's appearance, "comes directly from nature and is formed by the rule of necessity" ("On Grace and Dignity," NA 255; Curran 127), and thus cannot plausibly be taken as an expression of the moral character or condition of a person, which is determined by the person's will or free choice. Any aspect of beauty that can be interpreted as an expression of moral condition must thus be found in the voluntary actions of particular persons rather than in their fixed features. More specifically, grace, as a condition in which a person is not merely committed to doing what morality requires as a matter of principle but is also so committed to doing this that it has become part of his character and thus seems as much natural as voluntary, is revealed in the motions that accompany a person's directly willed actions but are not themselves consciously willed ("On Grace and Dignity," NA 167; Curran 136). For example, one can deduce from a person's words how he would like to be viewed, but what he really is must be guessed from the gestures accompanying the speech, in other words, from the uncontained movements. ("On Grace and Dignity," NA 268; Curran 137) It is in the unintentional accompaniments of intentional actions that we can discern people's real commitment to what they are doing and the ease with which they make that commitment; the latter is grace, and thus the Schiller writes, Human beings, as appearances, are also an object of the senses. Where the moral feeling finds satisfaction, the aesthetic feeling does not wish to be reduced, and the correspondence with an idea may not sacrifice any of the appearance. This, however, rigorously reason demands an ethical expression, the eye demands beauty just as persistently...both these demands are made of the same object, although they come from different courts of judgment. ("On Grace and Dignity," NA 277; Curran 144–5) But as far as morality alone is concerned, the mastery of will over inclination that is expressed in dignity is all that is required. For Kant, however, morality itself demands complete harmony between principle and inclination, because any tension between them is a sign that one's commitment to the principle of morality is not yet complete, one's good will or virtue not yet perfected. The self-mastery that is expressed in dignity may often be all that human beings can achieve under natural circumstances, and it certainly satisfies the demand for legality in our actions; but as Kant sees it morality requires that perfection of virtue or of the good will that he calls holiness (see Kant's response to Schiller in a note added to the second edition of Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of* *Human Reason*, 6:223–4n.). Thus Kant's conception of morality actually demands a greater attainment of principles and feelings than does Schiller's—although Schiller's might be the more plausible account of morality, that is, one that better accommodates the reality of the human condition, precisely for that reason. Indeed, Kant may have been carried away by the polemic with Schiller, because elsewhere his position is not that human beings must aim at holiness, but only at virtue, not at the elimination of all inclinations contrary to morality but at the strength of will to overcome them. 8.2 Aesthetic Education and the Achievement of Morality In Schiller's other main philosophical work, the *Letters On the Aesthetic Education of Mankind*, he certainly makes a much bolder claim than Kant would ever have countenanced, namely that "it is only through Beauty that man makes his way to Freedom" and thus to the achievement of morality and its external realization in political justice (Aesthetic Education, Second letter, p. 9). Here Schiller implies that the cultivation of taste through aesthetic education is a necessary as well as sufficient condition for the achievement of morality. Let us turn to Schiller's argument in more detail. Schiller's argument is that the cultivation of taste through aesthetic education is a necessary condition for the realization of morality, but that the realization of morality than Kant does. Schiller presents the problem to be solved by aesthetic education in several ways, but primarily as a political rather than a moral problem. In his Sixth Letter, he offers an influential diagnosis of alienation or fragmentation as the characteristic problem of modernity: "we see not merely individuals, but whole classes of people, developing but one part of their potentialities, while of the rest, as in stunted growths, only vestigial traces remain." (Aesthetic Education, p. 33). Although this is a problem for human flourishing generally, and might therefore be considered a moral rather than specifically political problem, Schiller's diagnosis of the source of this problem gives a prominent rôle to a specifically political cause. Schiller claims that the complex machinery of the state necessitates the separation of ranks and occupations, rather than claiming, as a Marxist diagnosis of alienation would, that a separation of ranks and occupations that has its source in the conditions of production necessitates the complex machinery of the state. In another famous passage, Schiller presents the problem as that of effecting the transition from a less just to a more just state without killing the patient in the operation: The state should not only respect the objective and generic character in its individual subjects; it should also honor their subjective and specific character, and in extending the invisible realm of morals take care not to depopulate the sensible realm of appearance. (Aesthetic Education, Fourth Letter, p. 19) The latter passage leads more directly to Schiller's most general characterization of the problem: striking the right balance between the universal and the particular, that is, not realizing the ideal at the cost of individuals nor so focusing on individuals as they currently are that all concern for the ideal is lost. Schiller characterizes the tension with which he is concerned through a number of contrasts: person and condition, the atemporal and the temporal, noumenon and phenomena, form and matter, and so on (Eleventh Letter). He points that we are driven in one direction by the "form drive" and in the other by the "sensuous drive" (Twelfth Letter). He then claims that we need to cultivate a new drive, the "play drive" (Fourteenth Letter), to bring these two drives, and thus person and condition, universal and particular, and so on, into proper balance with each other, "to preserve the life of sense against the encroachments of freedom; and second, to secure the personality against the forces of sensation" (Thirteenth Letter). Schiller's claim is then that it is the experience of beauty which will induce this balance in us, and thus what we need is to be educated to experience beauty. In practice, since individuals tend to ert in one direction or the other, that is, to be driven by principles at the cost of ignoring particulars or to be absorbed in particulars and thus inadequately attentive to principles, there will be two types of beauty, "energizing" beauty and "relaxing" beauty, which will either strengthen an individual's commitment to principle or relax the grip of principle on an individual, whichever is needed (Seventeenth Letter). These claims are grandiose and abstract. In a crucial footnote to the Thirteenth Letter, however, Schiller comes down to earth, and reveals that what he expects from aesthetic education is something quite specific, although for that reason all the more plausible. What he worried about is "the pernicious effect, upon both thought and action, of an undue surrender to our sensual nature" on the one hand and "the nefarious influence exerted upon our knowledge and upon our conduct by a preponderance of rationality" on the other. In the realm of scientific inquiry, what we need to learn and what we can learn from aesthetic experience is not to "thrust ourselves out upon [nature], with all the impatient anticipations of our reason," without having collected adequate data to support our theorizing. In the realm of conduct, thus of the moral generally and not just the realm of politics, what we need to learn is to be specifically attentive to the particular circumstances, needs, and feelings of others, and not just to impose our own views upon them. Schiller's argument comes down to the claim that through the cultivation of our aesthetic sensibility we can learn to be attentive to detail and particularity as well as to principle and generality, and that being so attentive is a necessary condition for both theoretical and practical success. And it seems plausible to suppose that this claim is true, and therefore that aesthetic education may play a valuable rôle in the theoretical and practical development of human beings, in modern society as much as in any other. But this is a far cry from any claim that aesthetic education is sufficient for either theoretical or moral development, or even that it is necessary for such development, as the only way to cultivate the necessary combination of sensitivities. In the case of the natural sciences, surely both their general principles and their particular techniques of observation must be taught directly, and presumably a well-managed scientific education could also teach the student not to project the principles unchecked by the data. In the case of morals and politics, surely the general principles must be clearly fixed in the mind of those being initiated into the relevant community, as well as a proper empathy for the actual circumstances of others; but while perhaps the latter could be cultivated by aesthetic education, presumably it could also be cultivated directly by suitably edifying moral discourses, and certainly the general principles of morality will still have to be directly taught or elicited. As we saw in section 7.2, Kant recognizes these limits on the significance of the cultivation of taste for moral development, but also described a wider variety of ways in which the former could be beneficial for the latter. The contribution to moral development that Schiller hopes to derive from aesthetic education is essentially cognitive: through the sensitivity to particularity that we acquire from aesthetic education we learn to recognize the circumstances, needs, and feelings of others and thereby to apply our principles to them appropriately. Kant, however, holds that aesthetic experience could give us sensible confirmation of the moral truths we already know through pure reason, but it also give us emotional support in our attempt to act as we know we should, although in no case does he argue that the support that morality can get from aesthetic experience is indispensable. Thus, although Schiller's essay "On Grace and Dignity" appears to argue for a greater rôle for feelings in fulfillment of the demands of morality, Kant allows, if it is only Kant who insists upon formal grounds for striving to realize grace and not just dignity. And while Schiller's letters on Aesthetic Education insist that aesthetic education is a necessary condition for social justice, Kant has a broader conception of the contributions that aesthetic experience may make to moral and political development, although he certainly does not make the cultivation of taste a necessary (let alone sufficient) condition for the realization of morality. 9. Herder's Critique of Kant: A Rapprochement between the Two Approaches? In the five years after the publication of Schiller's *Letters on Aesthetic Education* in 1795, both Romanticism and Absolute Idealism emerged, the former in works by Friedrich von Hardenburg ("Novalis") and Friedrich Schlegel, the latter in works by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. But since both of these movements blossomed more fully in the early decades of the nineteenth century, they will not be included in this survey. Instead, it will conclude with a second look at the work of Johann Herder, in this case with his late critique of Kant's aesthetic theory. Herder, who as we saw had done the bulk of his work in aesthetics long before the publications of Kant and Schiller, indeed even before the publication of Sulzer's encyclopedia, reacted violently to the new aesthetics of play in his late work *Kalligone* (1800), i.e., "The Birth of Beauty." This work, published only three years before Herder's death and after his renown had been eclipsed by such new stars as Schelling and Fichte, has never received much attention, but beneath its bursts of ill-temper it contains interesting and important criticisms of Kant. The theme of *Kalligone* may be summed up with this statement from its table of contents: "Nothing harms immature taste more than if one makes everything into play" (Kalligone, p. 660). Herder's critique came too late in his Kant's life for him to respond to it. If he had been able to respond, he would have had no good reply to some of Herder's criticisms; but if Herder had had more sympathy for Kant's expository method in the third Critique, he might have realized that on some of the central substantive points of his criticism the Schiller writes, Human beings, as appearances, are also an object of the senses. Where the moral feeling finds satisfaction, the aesthetic feeling does not wish to be reduced, and the correspondence with an idea may not sacrifice any of the appearance. This, however, rigorously reason demands an ethical expression, the eye demands beauty just as persistently...both these demands are made of the same object, although they come from different courts of judgment. ("On Grace and Dignity," NA 277; Curran 144–5) But as far as morality alone is concerned, the mastery of will over inclination that is expressed in dignity is all that is required. 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And it seems plausible to suppose that this claim is true, and therefore that aesthetic education may play a valuable rôle in the theoretical and practical development of human beings, in modern society as much as in any other. But this is a far cry from any claim that aesthetic education is sufficient for either theoretical or moral development, or even that it is necessary for such development, as the only way to cultivate the necessary combination of sensitivities. In the case of the natural sciences, surely both their general principles and their particular techniques of observation must be taught directly, and presumably a well-managed scientific education could also teach the student not to project the principles unchecked by the data. 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And while Schiller's letters on Aesthetic Education insist that aesthetic education is a necessary condition for social justice, Kant has a broader conception of the contributions that aesthetic experience may make to moral and political development, although he certainly does not make the cultivation of taste a necessary (let alone sufficient) condition for the realization of morality. 9. Herder's Critique of Kant: A Rapprochement between the Two Approaches? In the five years after the publication of Schiller's *Letters on Aesthetic Education* in 1795, both Romanticism and Absolute Idealism emerged, the former in works by Friedrich von Hardenburg ("Novalis") and Friedrich Schlegel, the latter in works by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. But since both of these movements blossomed more fully in the early decades of the nineteenth century, they will not be included in this survey. Instead, it will conclude with a second look at the work of Johann Herder, in this case with his late critique of Kant's aesthetic theory. Herder, who as we saw had done the bulk of his work in aesthetics long before the publications of Kant and Schiller, indeed even before the publication of Sulzer's encyclopedia, reacted violently to the new aesthetics of play in his late work *Kalligone* (1800), i.e., "The Birth of Beauty." This work, published only three years before Herder's death and after his renown had been eclipsed by such new stars as Schelling and Fichte, has never received much attention, but beneath its bursts of ill-temper it contains interesting and important criticisms of Kant. The theme of *Kalligone* may be summed up with this statement from its table of contents: "Nothing harms immature taste more than if one makes everything into play" (Kalligone, p. 660). Herder's critique came too late in his Kant's life for him to respond to it. 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